This study examines the impact of improvements in institutional oversight specifically for compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on accrual quality in Europe. The sample comprises 9339 firm-year observations from a treatment sample of three European countries that had either non-existent or relatively weak institutional oversight systems at the start of the sample period 2006-10 but improved their oversight systems thereafter, and a benchmark sample of six other European countries that had institutional oversight systems from the start of this sample period. After controlling for legal system, rule of law and other variables, we find incremental improvement in accrual quality in the treatment sample relative to the benchmark sample from the pre-enforcement period 2006-07 to the enforcement period 2008-10. The results suggest that institutional oversight has an incrementally positive impact on accrual quality over and above that attributable to legal system, rule of law and other variables. The results are robust to different measures of accrual quality, alternative enforcement proxy and alternative samples.
Introduction
This study examines whether improved institutional oversight of compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe leads to improved accrual quality. The adoption of IFRS in Europe and other developed economies is one of the most significant developments in financial reporting. 1 The global adoption of IFRS was motivated by the argument that the adoption of a single set of high quality standards would improve the reporting quality across the world and reduce international financial reporting diversity (Whittington 2005) . 2 However, the academic, regulatory and professional literature suggests that the mere adoption of IFRS without a rigorous enforcement regime would not improve reporting quality (Brown 2011; European Communities [EC] Since IFRS are principles-based standards, which allow accounting discretion and require managers to make judgments and estimates, a rigorous enforcement mechanism is needed to ensure compliance with the standards. The European IFRS Regulation describes the importance of rigorous enforcement of accounting standards, particularly a common approach to enforcement, as follows: However, not all European countries started accounting enforcement in the same year. For example, CESR (2007) notes that some countries (e.g., Belgium, Finland, and France) had full enforcement activity in 2006, while others (e.g., Germany, Ireland, and Sweden) had either partial or no enforcement activity in the same year. This differential enforcement activity by European countries offers a unique opportunity to examine the impact of enforcement activity on accrual quality.
European countries invested a considerable amount of resources -time, money and efforts -in establishing institutional oversight systems to ensure compliance with IFRS. This suggests that European countries expect that institutional oversight over IFRS compliance will be able to make incremental contribution to reporting quality over and beyond rule of law; otherwise it is difficult to justify the investment of a considerable amount of resources in establishing institutional oversight systems and monitoring compliance with IFRS. Therefore, from the perspectives of theory and policy prescriptions, it is important to examine whether institutional oversight over compliance with IFRS contributes to financial reporting quality (Brown 2011; Holthausen 2009; Pope and McLeay 2011) . This paper examines this issue empirically.
The paper uses a difference-in-difference research design for two groups of There is an emerging literature on the benefits of IFRS enforcement Christensen et al. 2013; Hitz et al. 2012; Preiato et al. 2013) . Unlike these prior studies that examine market based measures of accounting quality (e.g., analysts' forecast accuracy and dispersion, market liquidity), this paper examines a different outcome variable -accrual quality and contributes to this emerging literature on IFRS enforcement and its consequences.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review and section 3 describes institutional oversight systems in Europe to ensure compliance with IFRS. Section 4 develops the hypothesis and Section 5 discusses the methodology. Section 6 reports the results and the last section provides a summary and conclusion.
Literature review
This study is related to two streams of accounting literature. The first stream debates the pros and cons of the adoption of IFRS and examines the impact of IFRS on various reporting outcomes. The second stream argues that IFRS would not improve reporting quality unless they are enforced strictly.
IFRS and reporting quality
The major argument in favour of IFRS is that they will enhance the transparency and comparability of financial reporting by listed companies across the borders (Whittington 2005) . This, in turn, will contribute to the efficient and cost-effective functioning of the capital market, help protect the interests of investors and maintain their confidence in the financial market, facilitate the free flow of capital across borders, and create a level playing field for companies that compete for financial resources in the adopting countries (Armstrong et al. 2010; Florou and Pope 2009; Jones and Finley 2011; Li 2010) . These were the principal motivations for the adoption of IFRS in Europe (EC 2002) . Others argue that comparability of financial reporting across countries is unlikely as IFRS allow alternative accounting treatments and IFRS implementation will vary conditional on managers' reporting incentives, national institutions and cultures (Isidro and Raonic 2012; Kvaal and Nobes 2012; Schipper 2005; Soderstrom and Sun 2007) .
A growing number of studies examine the impacts of IFRS on various outcome variables but have mixed findings. Outcome variables include market reaction (Armstrong et al., 2010) , value relevance of earnings and book value (Clarkson et al., 2011; Goodwin et al., 2008; Liao et al. (2012) ), income smoothing and timeliness of loss recognition (Chua et al., 2012) , variability of financial statements ratios (Jones and Finley, 2011) , earnings management (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008) , discretionary accruals (Callao and Jarne, 2010; Kabir et al. (2010) , and accounting policy choices (Kvaal and Nobes, 2012; Nobes, 2011) .
IFRS, enforcement and reporting quality
Since IFRS allow reporting discretion, it is argued that IFRS would not improve reporting quality unless they are supported by a rigorous enforcement mechanism (EC 2002; FEE 2001 FEE , 2002 Holthausen 2009; US SEC 2000) . The European IFRS Regulation underscores the importance of a rigorous enforcement regime and calls for the development of a common approach to enforcement (EC 2002) .
Several studies document reporting benefits of strong rule of law (Armstrong et al. 2010; Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Florou and Pope, 2009) . Despite having relatively strong rule of law, with the adoption of IFRS, European countries started designing and implementing institutional oversight systems for monitoring and enforcing compliance with IFRS (CESR 2007 (CESR , 2010b ESMA 2011) . These enforcement efforts include the establishment of national oversight bodies in European countries and the monitoring and enforcement of IFRS by these oversight bodies (CESR 2007 (CESR , 2010b ESMA 2011) . Thus, it is important from the perspectives of both theory and policy prescription to examine whether the institutional oversight in Europe contributes to reporting quality (Holthausen 2009; Pope and McLeay 2011) . This is important because if the institutional oversight system in Europe does not contribute to accrual quality, it would be difficult to justify the considerable amount of coststime, money and other resources -involved in establishing national oversight bodies and monitoring and enforcing compliance with IFRS.
Several recent papers examine the effects of IFRS enforcement on market development and financial accounting transparency, market liquidity, abnormal returns, abnormal trading volumes and abnormal bid-ask spreads, and analysts' forecast accuracy and dispersion Christensen et al. 2013; Hitz et al., 2012; Preiato et al., 2013) . In contrast with these prior studies, this paper examines a different outcome variable -accrual quality and seeks to contribute to the emerging literature on IFRS enforcement and reporting quality in Europe.
Institutional oversight systems in Europe
European countries had diverse institutional oversight systems prior to the adoption of IFRS (FEE 2001) . In an overview of such systems prior to the adoption of IFRS in Regulators, standard-setters, professional organisations and academics have emphasised the need for rigorous enforcement mechanisms to achieve high quality financial reporting (FEE 2001; Holthausen 2009; US SEC 2000) . FEE (1999, p. 6) notes that the issue of accounting enforcement is 'of crucial importance to avoid incomplete and inconsistent implementation/ application'. The European IFRS regulation also emphasises the importance of rigorous enforcement of accounting standards, particularly a common approach to enforcement (EC 2002, recital n. 16 (CESR 2003) . 4 The standard recommends, inter alia, that (a) a competent independent administrative authority should be responsible for enforcement of accounting standards and have the necessary powers 5 and sufficient resources 6 , (b) the principles of enforcement in the standard should apply to both annual and interim financial statements and reports issued by issuers whose securities are admitted to trading in a regulated securities market, (c) in the case of material misstatements, the national enforcer should take appropriate actions to achieve appropriate disclosures and where relevant, public corrections of misstatements, and (d) actions should be effective, timely and proportional to the impact of detected infringement (CESR 2003) .
The standard advocates a mixed model whereby a risk-based approach is combined with a rotation/ sampling approach to select issuers and documents for enforcement (CESR 2003) . It further notes that methods of enforcement on selected information range from pure formal checks to in-depth substantive in-nature checks and the intensity of review should consider the level of risk, the type of document to be examined and the extent of information available on the issuer (CESR 2003 and this variation offers a unique opportunity to examine the impact of IFRS enforcement activity on accrual quality using a difference-in-difference research design.
Hypothesis development
One stated objective of the European enforcement efforts discussed above is to monitor and ensure the compliance of financial statements of European listed companies with IFRS (CESR 2003) . A review of the enforcement decisions published by the CESR and ESMA reveals that the decisions pertained to (a) classification (e.g., current vs. non-current liabilities, classification in the cash flow statement, classification of items in accordance with IAS 8, classification of an intangible asset as an intangible asset with indefinite life, and classification of an entity as a subsidiary), (b) disclosures (e.g., information regarding material intangibles, separate components of income tax, methodology to determine the recoverable amount and assumptions used in impairment testing), (c) presentation (e.g., presentation of an item either in profit or loss for the period, or other comprehensive income), (d) recognition (e.g., revenue recognition), and (e) measurement (e.g., measurement of fair value and accounting treatment of share-based payments, use of the appropriate market price to measure the fair value of shares, measurement of the liability component of compound financial instruments, measurement of recoverable amount and impairment loss, inappropriate application of the definition of the grant date for share-based payments) (CESR 2010a (CESR , 2010c ESMA 2011). This suggests that European national enforcers monitor and enforce a wide range of aspects of financial reporting -classification, presentation, disclosure, recognition and measurement -by reporting entities. Issues pertaining to recognition (e.g., revenue recognition) and measurement (e.g., use of the appropriate grant date for share-based payments, use of the appropriate market price for measuring the fair value) clearly impact on accruals. Further, some classification issues also affect accounting accruals. For example, the classification of an intangible as having an indefinite useful, rather than limited, life affects amortisation expenses. These monitoring and enforcement activities are likely to constrain managerial discretion in recognition, measurement and classification in accounting and improve accrual quality.
Accrual quality is likely to improve in all the sample countries over time as a result of the enhanced enforcement efforts discussed above. However, two factors may confound the impact of enforcement activities on accrual quality in the sample. First, accrual quality may improve over time as a result of the learning curve effect (Brown 2011) . Managers of European firms may become accustomed to making estimates and judgements inherent in IFRS over time, which may improve accrual quality over time. Second, the study period 2006-10 contains the economic recession of 2008. As a result of criticisms of financial reporting standards and reporting quality in the wake of the financial crisis, managers may intensify their efforts to implement IFRS properly. 13 To isolate the impact of improved institutional oversight on accrual quality from that of the learning curve phenomenon and economic recession, this paper focuses on the impact of oversight on accrual quality in the treatment sample. The treatment sample consists of countries with either no or weak institutional oversight systems for compliance with IFRS in 2006 and 2007 but improved oversight systems after that. On the other hand, the benchmark sample is comprised of countries that had stronger oversight systems than the treatment sample from the start (i.e., 2006) of the sample period. Thus, the treatment sample is likely to experience the greatest improvement in accrual quality during the sample period. Since the learning curve effect and the economic recession apply to both the benchmark sample and the treatment sample, any incremental improvement in accrual quality in the treatment sample over and above that of the benchmark sample can be attributed to enhanced monitoring and enforcement efforts in the treatment sample during the period. Thus, the research hypothesis is as follows:
H1: Accrual quality is likely to improve more in the treatment sample countries than in the benchmark sample countries as a result of increased enforcement activities by European national enforcers.
Methodology

Accrual quality
IFRS require managers to make accounting estimates and judgments, and accruals under IFRS are the result of these estimates and judgments. As discussed above, national institutional oversight bodies in Europe monitor managers' accounting decisions relating to accounting classification, recognition and measurement.
Therefore, managers and enforcement of IFRS by institutional oversight bodies have a direct impact on accruals 14 and accrual quality is an appropriate measure of reporting outcome for assessing the impact of institutional oversight in Europe.
Further, accrual quality has construct validity and can be measured reliably across jurisdictions (Schipper 2005) . It is a summary indicator of financial reporting quality (Francis et al. 2006) and has been widely used as a measure of earnings quality in the accounting literature (Francis et al. 2006 ). Accrual quality is also an important dimension of reporting as it impacts on the cost of equity (Francis et al. 2004) , asset allocation decisions (Florou and Pope 2009) , and IPO underpricing (Boulton et al. 2011 ). Thus, using accrual quality as an outcome variable is consistent with the objective of financial reporting of providing useful information for decision-making. 15 Many accrual models have been used in the literature (Ball and Shivakumar 2006; DeAngelo 1986; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Healy 1985; Jones 1991; Kothari et al. 2005) . However, there is no conclusive evidence on which accrual model is the best (Gul et al. 2009 ).
We use the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model to estimate discretionary accruals. This model is augmented by including lagged return on assets and change in cash flow from operations (ΔCFO). The Jones (1991) model is widely used in the earnings management literature (DeFond, 2010) . Lagged return on assets and ΔCFO are included as independent variables as proposed by Kothari et al. (2005) and Dechow (1994) , respectively. This model is expressed as follows:
Where:
ACCi,t = total accruals of firm i for year t, measured as profit after tax less cash flow from operating activities (CFO), deflated by total assets at the end of t-1.
TAi,t-1 = total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1.
ΔREVi,t = change in revenue of firm i in year t, deflated by total assets at the end of year t-1.
FAi,t = fixed assets of firm i at the end of year t, deflated by total assets at the end of year t-1. 16 ROAi,t-1 = lagged return on assets, measured as earnings before interest and tax of year t-1 divided by total assets at the end of year t-1.
ΔCFOi,t = change in cash flow from operations of firm i during t, deflated by total assets at the end of year t-1.
We apply model (1) to each country-industry-year 17 and, following Kothari et al. (2005) , require each country-industry-year combination to have at least 10 observations. We take the absolute residual from the model to indicate absolute discretionary accruals [|DACC|] and use |DACC| as the measure of accrual quality on the premise that both upward and downward adjustments of reported earnings are indications of earnings management and, hence, poor earnings quality (Gul et al. 2009 ). 18
Control variables
We include eleven control variables -(a) basis of legal system (common or code), (b) the quality of the rule of law, (c) difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS, (d) growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), (e) change in stock market index, (f) market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP, (g) revenue growth, (h) absolute magnitude of accruals, (i) firm size, (j) leverage, and (k) market-to-book ratio. In addition to the eleven control variables, we also control for industry fixed effects.
Legal origin is used extensively in earnings quality studies (Soderstrom and Sun 2007) . Common law countries have developed stock markets, pre-dominance of equity financing, better investor protection, lower ownership concentration and higher spending on auditing services (Ali and Hwang 2000; La Porta et al. 1998 ). Soderstrom and Sun (2007) note that the legal system affects earnings quality directly through legal enforcement and indirectly through financial reporting incentives such as those provided by financial market development, capital structures, and ownership structures. Thus, this legal system variable controls for many country-level variables that impact on accounting quality (Ali and Hwang 2000; Soderstrom and Sun 2007) . This dummy variable equals 1 for common law countries and 0 for code law countries.
Prior research (Armstrong et al. 2010; Daske et al. 2008; Florou and Pope 2009; Li 2010 ) documents IFRS benefits (e.g., decrease in cost of equity capital, increase in market liquidity and equity ownership) arising from strong legal enforcement and uses either the rule of law index developed by Kaufmann et al. (2007 Kaufmann et al. ( , 2008 or the average score of the efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, and corruption from La Porta et al. (1998) as the proxy for legal enforcement. Both proxies broadly measure the quality of the legal and judicial system of a country. Since we examine the impact of institutional oversight system on accrual quality, we control for the quality of the rule of law and use the rule of law index from Kaufmann et al. (2007) as the majority of prior studies use this proxy for legal enforcement and Kaufmann et al.'s (2007) rule of law index is more recent than the La Porta et al. (1998) index (Armstrong et al. 2010; Daske et al. 2008; Florou and Pope 2009 ).
The third control variable is the difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS. Bae et al. (2008) document different degrees of discrepancies between pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS for 49 countries. Since firms domiciled in a country with more discrepancies between its pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS may expect larger improvement in accrual quality, we control for this variable. We use the Bae et al.
(2008) measure of difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS and higher scores indicate greater discrepancies.
GDP growth rate and change in stock market index are used as a control variable because the study period includes the recessionary period and there has been variation in GDP growth rate and stock market performance across countries in this period (Holder et al. 2013) . Market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP is used as a proxy for the development of the stock market. Demand for accounting information from market participants to mitigate the adverse selection problem provides incentives for corporate managers to improve the quality of earnings (Soderstrom and Sun 2007) . Thus, earnings quality is likely to be better in countries where the stock market plays an important role in corporate financing.
Managers of growth firms are likely to manage earnings to avoid earnings disappointment (Callao and Jarne 2010) . Further, growth firms are likely to operate in uncertain environments (Dechow and Schrand 2004) . Thus, accrual quality is likely to be negatively associated with revenue growth.
Accrual quality is also likely to be negatively associated with the absolute magnitude of accruals as accruals require estimations and judgments, and larger accruals (of either sign) may indicate underlying volatility in the companies' operations and may contain estimation errors (Dechow and Schrand 2004) . Further, prior research finds that managers manage earnings through accruals (Dechow and Schrand 2004) . This suggests that accruals may reflect managers' financial reporting incentives which may impinge on accrual quality. Therefore, we control for both revenue growth and absolute magnitude of accruals.
Larger firms are more likely to manage earnings than smaller ones to reduce political costs (Watts and Zimmerman 1986 ). This suggests a negative relation between firm size and accrual quality. However, larger firms have a better information environment than smaller ones as larger firms disclose more information and are followed by more securities analysts (Hope 2003) . 19 This suggests a positive relation between size and accrual quality. Hence, we do not hypothesize the direction of association between firm size and accrual quality.
Banks and other lenders have private access to corporate managers (Ball et al. 2000; Soderstrom and Sun 2007) . Thus, the demand for higher quality accounting information could be less for firms with higher leverage. Further, prior studies found that leverage is associated with earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994;
Duke and Hunt 1990). Thus, accounting quality is likely to be lower in firms with high leverage (Soderstrom and Sun 2007) . However, accrual quality may be positively associated with leverage because lenders have huge financial stakes in the firms and hence, have motivation to monitor financial reporting of the borrower. Therefore, we do not hypothesize the direction of the relationship between accrual quality and leverage.
Market-to-book ratio is used in the literature as a proxy of unconditional conservatism and the accounting literature documents a negative association between conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan 2005; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007) . Since accruals are used to implement conditional conservatism, market-to-book ratio is included as a control variable.
Research design and empirical model
This study uses a difference-in-difference research design to test the hypothesis. We use a benchmark sample and a treatment sample and data for five years, 2006-10.
To identify the benchmark and treatment samples, we use the report by CESR (2007).
The CESR report (2007) To check the reasonableness of the designation of our sample countries as belonging to either treatment or benchmark sample, we compare the changes in the value of the accounting enforcement index of Brown et al. (2013, 
Where: 
= Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of country k in year t
MCGDPk,t = market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP of country k in year t
ΔINDEXk,t = change in stock market index of country k in year t, REVGROWi,t = the annual change in revenue of firm i from year t-1 to year t deflated by sales in year t-1 |ACCi,t| = the absolute magnitude of total accruals of firm i in year t SIZEi,t = natural log of total assets of firm i at the end of year t
LEVi,t = total debt to total assets of firm i at the end of year t (M/B)i,t = market-to-book ratio of firm i at the end of year t
Industry Dummies = eight industry dummies used to represent nine industries.
Since the value of |DACCi,t| is truncated at zero, a Tobit regression is run to estimate the coefficients of model (2) (Gul et al., 2009) . β3 (i.e., the coefficient of TS*ENFOR) is the coefficient of interest in model (2). As shown in Table 1 , (α +β1) and (α +β1 + β2 + β3) are the accrual quality of the treatment sample during the preenforcement period and the enforcement period, respectively. On the other hand, α and (α +β2) are the accrual quality of the benchmark sample during the preenforcement period and the enforcement period, respectively. The change in accrual quality (i.e., β2 + β3) in the treatment sample from the pre-enforcement period to the enforcement period could be the result of improvement in institutional oversight as well as learning experience with IFRS and the financial crisis of 2008. To mitigate the confounding effects of learning experience and the financial crisis, we deduct the change in accrual quality in the benchmark sample (i.e., β2) during the same period from the change in accrual quality in the treatment sample (i.e., β2 + β3). The resulting difference in accrual quality, i.e., β3, is attributed to improvement in institutional oversight in the treatment sample from the pre-enforcement period to the enforcement period. 22 Since a higher value of |DACCi,t| indicates a lower accrual quality, a negative sign of β3 will support the hypothesis. Table 5 .
We collect data on firm-level variables from OSIRIS, data on legal system from La Porta et al. (1998) , data on the rule of law index of the sample countries from Kaufmann et al. (2007) , data on the difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS from Bae et al. (2008) , data on stock market indices from the websites of the stock exchanges of the sample countries, and data on GDP growth rates and market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP from the website of the World Bank. 26 Table 2 Compared with the benchmark sample, the treatment sample has, on average, greater rule of law, greater difference between pre-IFRS local GAAP and IFRS, higher GDP growth rate, greater increase in stock market indices, and lower market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP. Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients among model (2)'s independent continuous variables. The maximum correlation coefficient is -0.560 between GAAPDIFFK and MCGDPk,t. This is well below the 0.80 threshold beyond which multicollinearity problems may arise (Gujarati 2003) . β3 (i.e., the coefficient of TS*ENFOR) has the predicted negative sign and is significant at less than 1 percent. As explained above, β3 captures the differential change in accrual quality in the treatment sample from the pre-enforcement period 2006-07 to the enforcement period 2008-10 over and above that in the benchmark sample. Hence, the observed significant negative sign of β3 suggests incremental improvement in accrual quality in the treatment sample relative to the benchmark sample from the pre-enforcement period to the enforcement period. This supports the research hypothesis. Furthermore, since model (2) controls for, inter alia, legal system and rule of law, the observed accrual quality improvement in the treatment sample during the enforcement period is incremental to the accrual quality benefits attributable to the legal system and the rule of law.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Impact of institutional oversight on accrual quality
Sensitivity analyses
To test the robustness of the results in Table 5 , we conducted the following sensitivity analyses.
Positive and negative discretionary accruals
The use of absolute discretionary accruals, |DACCi,t|, as the measure of accrual quality in this study is premised on the assumption that IFRS enforcement has symmetrical effects on both positive and negative discretionary accruals. This is consistent with prior studies where monitors (e.g., the auditor) are observed to have symmetrical effects on discretionary accruals (Becker et al., 1998; Gul et al., 2009 ).
On the other hand, Watts (1977, p. 67) suggests that losses from overstated income are more observable and usable in the political process than forgone gains due to understated income. Consistent with this, Nelson et al. (2003, Becker et al. (1998) and Gul et al. (2009 ) , we run models (3) and (4) for positive and negative discretionary accruals, respectively. If IFRS enforcement has symmetrical effects on discretionary accruals, it will reduce the size of both positive and negative discretionary accruals. Hence, β3
will have a negative sign in model (3) but a positive sign in model (4).
PDACCi,t = α +β1TS + β2ENFOR+ β3TS*ENFOR + β4LEGALk+ + β5RULEOFLAWk + β6GAAPDIFFk + β7GDPGROWTHk,t + β8ΔINDEXk,t + β9MCGDPk,t + β10REVGROWi,t + β11|ACCi,t| + β12SIZEi,t + β13LEVi,t + β14(M/B)i,t + Industry Dummies + εi,t (3)
NDACCi,t = α +β1TS + β2ENFOR+ β3TS*ENFOR + β4LEGALk+ + β5RULEOFLAWk + β6GAAPDIFFk + β7GDPGROWTHk,t + β8ΔINDEXk,t + β9MCGDPk,t + β10REVGROWi,t + β11|ACCi,t| + β12SIZEi,t + β13LEVi,t + β14(M/B)i,t + Industry Dummies + εi,t
NDACCi,t = positive discretionary accruals estimated from model (1)
Negative discretionary accruals estimated from model (1) All other variables are defined as in model (2).
Since both dependent variables, PDACCi,t, and NDACCi,t, of models (3) and (4) are truncated at zero, Tobit regression is used to estimate the coefficients of the models.
The results are reported in the last two columns of Table 5 . Consistent with symmetrical effects on discretionary accruals, the coefficient of TS*ENFOR is statistically significantly negative in model (3) but significantly positive in model (4), suggesting that IFRS enforcement reduces the size of both positive and negative discretionary accruals. 27
Alternative accounting enforcement proxy
To investigate the sensitivity of our results to our proxy of enforcement, we use Brown Other variables are defined as in model (2).
The coefficient of ENFORCEMENT is negative and significant at less than 5 percent (results not in the table). Taken together, the results suggest that better enforcement is associated with lower absolute discretionary accruals and higher accrual quality.
Summary and conclusion
We examine whether accrual quality improves as a result of improvements in IFRS enforcement efforts in Europe. The sample comprises 9339 firm-year observations from 9 European countries. Three of these countries -Germany, the Netherlands, We observe incremental improvement in accrual quality in the treatment sample relative to the benchmark sample during the enforcement period 2008-10. Given that both the control and treatment samples are subject to the learning curve effect and the impact of the recent economic recession, the observed incremental improvement in accrual quality in the treatment sample relative to the benchmark sample can be attributed to the improvement in institutional oversight over compliance with IFRS.
Further, we observe these results after controlling for legal system and rule of law, which is used as a proxy of legal enforcement in prior IFRS studies (Daske et al. 2008; Florou and Pope 2009; Li 2010) . Therefore, the observed improvement in accrual quality in the treatment sample suggests that institutional oversight has an incrementally positive impact on accrual quality over and above that attributable to legal system and rule of law. The results are robust to alternative accrual quality measures, alternative samples and alternative enforcement proxy.
The findings support the push for greater enforcement efforts in Europe and have policy implications for countries contemplating the adoption of IFRS in the future.
Our paper contributes to the emerging literature on accounting enforcement Christensen et al. 2013; Hitz et al. 2012; Preiato et al. 2013) . In contrast with these studies, we examine the impact of accounting enforcement on a different outcome variable -accrual quality and report results consistent with these studies.
Caveats are appropriate here. The accounting literature suggests that accounting quality is shaped by many factors (Soderstrom and Sun 2007) . While we control for eleven variables, we recognise that we might not have controlled for all factors.
Especially, the enforcement period coincides with the global financial crisis (GFC).
To mitigate the confounding effect of GFC, we use GDP growth rate and changes in stock market indices as control variables and the difference-in-difference research design. But we recognise that GFC might still confound the results. Further, while we use multiple measures of accrual quality in this study, they may be subject to measurement error. We also do not investigate the impact of enforcement efforts on other measures of earnings quality (e.g., value relevance of earnings and book value, comparability of financial reporting across European countries, conservatism).
Further, while the CESR (2003) Standard 1 specifies the minimum criteria for ensuring effective enforcement of IFRS and compliance with the standard improves IFRS enforcement, there may be variations in national enforcement efforts and hence variation in accrual quality Pope and McLeay 2011) . Finally, Christensen et al. (2008) Several benefits have been claimed to emanate from the global adoption of IFRS. These include reduction in costs of preparing financial statements according to multiple sets of accounting rules in multiple jurisdictions, free flow of capital across the borders, reduced cost for regulators involved in understanding different reporting regimes, efficient and better training of auditors, and reduction in cost of capital (Tweedie 2006) .
3
The ESMA succeeded the CESR as the pan European supervisory authority in 2010.
4
The CESR (2003) envisages the scope of enforcement to cover both consolidated and non-consolidated accounts and both IFRS and national GAAPs.
5
The necessary powers should include at least powers to monitor financial information, require supplementary information from issuers and auditors, and take appropriate actions consistent with the purposes of enforcement (CESR 2003). 6 Resources include professional, skilled staff experienced with the reporting framework and the legal implications of enforcement (CESR 2003) .
7
The countries are Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. The countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Poland, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Malta, and Germany. The countries are Austria, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, and Ireland. 10 The countries are Ireland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. 11 The countries are Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania. 12 The countries are Austria and Slovakia. 13 The criticisms were primarily targeted towards financial reporting by financial institutions (Financial Crisis Advisory Group 2009 Table 5 . We estimate PPE by deducting land from fixed assets. Land value is set to zero if land value is not reported in OSIRIS for a firm-year. 17 The mean (median) adjusted R 2 of 229 country-industry-year specific accrual models is 0.350 (0.350) (results not in the table). The explanatory powers of the accrual models in our study are comparable with other studies. For example, Ball and Shivakumar (2006 , Table 3 ) compared the explanatory powers of different accrual models and reported an adjusted R 2 that ranged from 4.00% to 30.20%. Further, the mean (median) |DACCi,t| in our sample is 4.92% (3.39%) of total assets. In contrast, Gul et al. (2009) report a mean (median) absolute discretionary accruals of 4% (2.6%) of total assets for their US sample. Becker et al. (1998) report mean (median) absolute discretionary accruals of 12.9% (6.3%) and 17% (8.8%) of total assets for two sub-samples of US firms. Thus, the magnitude of mean (median) |DACCi,t| in our study is consistent with prior studies. 18 We also run accrual model (6) and use estimated |DACCi,t| in model (2) to check the sensitivity of the results to the accrual model. The results (not in table) are similar to those reported in Table 5 . (Brown et al. 2013, Appendix 2) . A higher value indicates more stringent enforcement and vice versa. 22 The difference-in-difference research design has been used in the accounting literature to address similar research questions (Holder et al. 2013; Kang et al. 2012; Li 2010) . Pope and McLeay (2011) also suggest this research design for investigating the impact of IFRS. 23 OSIRIS classifies accounting standards into four types: (a) IFRS, (b) IFRS -NFC, (c) Local GAAP, and (d) Accounting standards N/A. We include a firm-year only if the accounting standard type for that firm-year is IFRS. NFC stands for 'not fully complied'. 24 A negative book value of equity gives a negative market value-to-book value ratio, which is difficult to interpret. Thus, following Pae et al. (2005) , we exclude firm-year observations with negative book value of equity. 25 In an additional test, we exclude Sweden from the treatment sample and run model (2) on the ground that Sweden had an enforcement mechanism before (FEE, 2001 . The results (not in the table) for this reduced sample are similar to those in Table 5 . 26 The website address is http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 27 We re-estimate models (3) and (4) with Huber/White standard errors and covariances (using EViews software). The results (not in the table) are very similar to those reported in the last two columns of Table  5 . The coefficient of the variable TS*ENFOR is negative and significant at less than 1 percent in model (3) but positive and significant at less than 5 percent in model (4). Note: The coefficients in this figure are from model (2). α +β1 + β2 + β3 = accrual quality of treatment sample during the enforcement period, α +β1 = accrual quality of treatment sample during the pre-enforcement period, α + β2= accrual quality of benchmark sample during the enforcement period, α = accrual quality of benchmark sample during the pre-enforcement period. = the annual change in revenue of firm i from year t-1 to year t deflated by sales in year t-1, |ACCi,t| = the absolute magnitude of total accruals of firm i in year t, SIZEi,t = natural log of total assets of firm i at the end of year t, LEVi,t = total debt to total assets of firm i at the end of year t, and (M/B)i,t = market-to-book ratio of firm i at the end of year t. Notes: ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively, t-statistics (two-tailed) are in parentheses. |DACCi,t| = absolute discretionary accruals of firm i of year, t estimated from accrual model (1). PDACCi,t = positive discretionary accruals of firm i of year t estimated from accrual model (1).
NDACCi,t = negative discretionary accruals of firm i of year t estimated from accrual model (1). TS = 1 if the observation is from the treatment sample, 0 otherwise, ENFOR = 1 if the observation is from the period 2008-2010, 0 otherwise, TS*ENFOR = interaction between TS and ENFOR, LEGAL = 1 if the observation is from a common law country, 0 otherwise, and Industry Dummies = eight industry dummies are used to represent nine industries.
Other variables are as defined in Table 3 .
